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InTRodUCTIon
To shore up the $46 billion pension debt the state has accrued over the past several 
decades, Illinois has been using its teachers as a piggy bank. New legislation adopted in 
December 2013 will raise the retirement age for mid-career workers and limit the amount 
retiree pensions can increase with inflation over time. State and national union leaders 
have called these changes “pension theft” and threatened to sue.
The current uproar has focused mainly on relatively senior workers, but Illinois legislators 
enacted even stiffer penalties for new teachers in 2010.  The 2010 bill had similar elements 
as the 2013 version—it raised the age at which new teachers could retire and reduced the 
amount their pensions could adjust for inflation—but it also placed a cap on the amount 
of retirement benefits they could earn.1 Most important, the 2010 law made it much 
harder for new teachers to earn a pension at all by lengthening the time they would be 
required to work before qualifying for a pension, from five years to ten. 
The changes will collectively save the state billions of dollars over the next thirty-five years, 
but the “savings” will come out of the pockets of teachers entering classrooms in the coming 
years. If a teacher leaves before ten years, Illinois will refund his or her contributions, but it 
won’t pay any interest, and it won’t contribute anything on its own. The state estimates that 
62 percent of its new teachers won’t make it to ten years,2 meaning Illinois will be forcibly 
taking no-interest loans from the majority of new teachers. 
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Illinois’s laws are particularly harmful to younger teachers and teachers who move to or 
from the state. But Illinois isn’t alone. Collectively, the states are facing a $1.4 trillion 
shortfall for public sector pensions and benefits, and they are responding by increasing 
out-of-pocket costs for teachers and mandatory contributions from school districts and 
enacting punitive policies similar to those in Illinois. State and local governments have 
made their pension systems less friendly to young and mobile workers by lengthening 
vesting periods and creating separate, less generous plans for new employees. 
This is not a marginal problem. Numbering 3.3 million, public school teachers constitute 
the largest class of workers in the country, and teaching is by far the largest profession 
made up of college-educated workers. In other words, policymakers are systematically 
disadvantaging our largest class of bachelor’s-degree-equipped workers. Saving for 
retirement is a nationwide problem—a recent study found that 92 percent of households 
do not meet retirement savings targets for their age and income.3 Yet for most workers, 
public policies are not to blame for their lack of saving. For public school teachers, 
however, retirement insecurity is a problem resulting from poorly structured policies put 
in place over the past few decades state by state and city by city.
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wInneRs and loseRs
Most observers of the current pension system point to a small group of winners: the 
fraction of teachers who stay in one pension plan for their career (that is, those teachers 
who do not change careers or decide to move and teach elsewhere). The teachers who 
dedicate their careers to working in public schools in the same plan do, in fact, benefit 
from the current system. They can earn a steady stream of income, adjusted for inflation 
as they age, that’s guaranteed to last their entire lifetime. Employers can augment the 
retirement benefits for teachers committed to staying within one pension plan (which 
in practice means a single state or, in states with multiple pension plans, a single school 
district) for their entire career because of all of the ex-teachers who leave early and leave 
behind benefits as a result. Some might consider this a just reward for a career in service 
of a higher calling, for staying put while others leave, and for years of a low base salary 
in exchange for the promise of a secure retirement.4 Where proponents see the financial 
security of this arrangement, critics decry the generosity or envy the fact that few private 
sector workers have comparable retirement benefits (See Comparing Public and Private 
Sector Retirement on page 19). 
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Yet this type of thinking—protecting the few at the expense of the many—ignores the 
plight of the millions of losers in the current system. Education is a field with significant 
turnover: the vast majority of teachers will not stay in teaching their entire career. 
Nationwide, nearly half of all teachers will leave the profession before reaching five 
years.5 Only a small fraction of those who start out as teachers will remain in teaching 
throughout their entire working lives. The biggest losers under the current arrangement 
are ex-teachers, but mobile teachers lose out as well. Even if someone does stay in 
teaching, the current system advantages only those career teachers who stay put and never 
cross state borders, or in some cases school district lines, to teach somewhere else. 
Over the years, states have instituted rules to make it more difficult for teachers to earn 
pension benefits at all. For example, during the recent recession, twelve states, including 
Illinois, lengthened their “vesting period,” the time a teacher must be employed before 
becoming eligible for pension benefits.6 This change helps limit state funding obligations 
by reducing the number of teachers eligible for benefits. 
Figure 1 shows the various state vesting requirements.  
One state, Arizona, allows teachers to vest immediately. 
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia required 
teachers to stay in the state pension plan for five years 
before vesting, and another seventeen required them to  
stay ten years. 
Many teachers will never meet their vesting requirements. 
It’s possible to get a sense of how big this problem is from 
the state teacher pension plans themselves. Every state 
publishes “withdrawal” tables that estimate how many 
teachers will leave in a given year. These estimates are typically based on the state’s actual 
turnover rates, and they are used to determine how well a pension plan is funded and how 
much money the state needs to contribute each year. By comparing the withdrawal rates 
and the vesting requirements set by states, it’s possible to estimate for all fifty states and 
the District of Columbia the percentage of new teachers who will ever earn a pension (see 
Methodology section for an explanation of how to calculate these rates, and see Figure 2 
for state data). 
The percentage of teachers who vest in their state’s pension plan varies widely depending 
on the length of the vesting requirement and the estimated turnover rate. Due to its 
Each year, tens of thousands 
of teachers will leave the 
profession with very little 
retirement savings, making  
it much harder for them to 
earn a secure retirement  
over their careers. 
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immediate vesting provision, all teachers in Arizona qualify for at least a minimal 
pension benefit. At least two-thirds of teachers in Idaho, California, and Kentucky will 
also qualify for a pension benefit. But those are the exceptions. Maine estimates that 86.1 
percent of teachers will not qualify for a pension, and the District of Columbia estimates 
that four-out-of-five beginning teachers will not vest. According to their own data, only 
about 25 percent of teachers will vest in Mississippi, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, 
and Hawaii, and less than 35 percent of teachers will stay long enough to qualify for a 
pension in Florida, Nebraska, Indiana, South Carolina, New Mexico, Ohio, Georgia, and 
North Carolina.7 In the median state, only 44.5 percent of new teachers will stay long 
enough to earn a minimum pension. Each year, tens of thousands of teachers will leave 
the profession with very little retirement savings, making it much harder for them to earn 
a secure retirement over their careers. 
It’s possible to use these calculations to estimate how many additional teachers a state puts 
on a path to retirement insecurity when it lengthens vesting requirements. Going back to 
the Illinois example, in 2010, state legislators lengthened the vesting requirement for new 
teachers from five years to ten. Illinois knew that a large percentage of teachers weren’t 
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making it to five years, let alone ten. According to the state’s own figures, 66.6 percent 
of teachers were able to qualify for the old, shorter vesting requirement. With a ten-year 
waiting period, only 38.0 percent of teachers will meet the state’s vesting requirements, 
a 28.6 percentage point decline. Now nearly two-thirds of new teachers in Illinois won’t 
meet the vesting requirement and will leave Illinois’s teacher pension system without 
qualifying for a pension and on a poor retirement savings path.
Vesting is an important milestone in state pension plans, but it guarantees only a minimum 
annuity in retirement. The largest rewards go to those who remain in the system for 
thirty or more years. This is a relatively small group. For example, a recent paper found 
that fewer than 10 percent of teachers will reach the maximum benefit in eight of the ten 
largest school districts in the U.S.8 The median state estimates that only 19.7 percent of 
beginning teachers will stay long enough to reach the state’s normal retirement age (and 
qualify for an unreduced pension benefit). Nine states—Maine, Vermont, South Dakota, 
New Hampshire, Mississippi, Wyoming, Texas, Nebraska, and Arizona—and the District 
of Columbia estimate that fewer than 10 percent of teachers will remain in the state 
system long enough to be eligible for normal retirement benefits (See Figure 2 for every 
state’s assumption). 
Some teachers are wholly dependent on their state pension plan. All private sector 
workers are enrolled in Social Security so many Americans do not realize that not all 
public sectors workers are. Today, coverage varies across the states, and nearly 7 million 
government workers do not participate in Social Security, including 40 percent of all K–12 
teachers. A substantial portion of teachers in fifteen states—Alaska, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, 
Nevada, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas—are not enrolled in Social Security. Not only do 
many of these teachers miss out on benefits from their state’s pension system, but once 
they transition to other jobs, they will also have fewer years of earnings from which to 
draw a Social Security benefit.
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sTaTe daTa on TeaCheR vesTIng ReQUIRemenTs and ReTIRemenT elIgIbIlITy
State
Years to  
Full 
Vesting
Estimated 
% Who Vest
Estimated 
% Who Do 
Not Vest
Normal 
Retirement 
Age
Estimated 
% Reaching 
Normal 
Retirement 
Age
Estimated % 
Not Reaching 
Normal 
Retirement 
Age
Alabama 10 39.4 60.6 62 27.0 73.0
Alaska* 5 46.9 53.1 60 12.0 88.0
Arizona** 0 100.0 0.0 55 9.9 90.1
Arkansas 5 56.6 43.4 53 30.8 69.2
California 5 69.1 30.9 62 48.2 51.8
Colorado 5 58.0 42.0 58 12.8 87.2
Connecticut 10 54.8 45.2 60 33.6 66.4
Delaware 10 35.3 64.7 55 21.3 78.7
District of 
Columbia 5 18.8 81.2 55 4.2 95.8
Florida 8 28.6 71.4 58 11.4 88.6
Georgia 10 34.5 65.5 55 20.6 79.4
Hawaii 10 25.5 74.5 60 11.4 88.6
Idaho 5 70.3 29.7 65 30.7 69.3
Illinois 10 38.0 62.0 60 20.4 79.6
Indiana 10 32.0 68.0 55 20.5 79.5
Iowa 7 42.1 57.9 57 24.5 75.5
Kansas 5 44.5 55.5 60 23.5 76.5
Kentucky 5 67.3 32.7 52 43.0 57.0
Louisiana 5 55.6 44.4 60 15.8 84.2
Maine 5 13.9 86.1 60 1.8 98.2
Maryland 10 42.9 57.1 58 27.1 72.9
Massachusetts 10 35.6 64.4 60 16.6 83.4
Michigan 10 43.4 56.6 60 27.3 72.7
Minnesota 3 49.7 50.3 66 22.0 78.0
Mississippi 8 23.9 76.1 55 5.9 94.1
Missouri 5 57.7 42.3 53 38.1 61.9
fIgURe 2
Note: The table is based on state assumptions for twenty-five-year-old female teachers who begin their teaching experience 
after August 1, 2013. Source: Authors’ calculations from state Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports. 
*Alaska has offered only a defined contribution plan to teachers hired after July 1, 2006. For Alaska, we use the 
assumptions from its defined benefit plan offered to teachers hired before July 1, 2006.
**All beginning teachers in Arizona are immediately vested in the Arizona State Retirement System.
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sTaTe daTa on TeaCheR vesTIng ReQUIRemenTs and ReTIRemenT elIgIbIlITy (continued)
State
Years to  
Full 
Vesting
Estimated 
% Who Vest
Estimated 
% Who Do 
Not Vest
Normal 
Retirement 
Age
Estimated 
% Reaching 
Normal 
Retirement 
Age
Estimated % 
Not Reaching 
Normal 
Retirement 
Age
Montana 5 35.3 64.7 55 18.3 81.7
Nebraska 5 31.7 68.3 65 9.8 90.2
Nevada 5 55.3 44.7 55 28.7 71.3
New 
Hampshire 10 25.1 74.9 65 5.7 94.3
New Jersey 10 55.0 45.0 65 41.9 58.1
New Mexico 5 33.5 66.5 55 16.5 83.5
New York 10 40.3 59.7 63 29.2 70.8
North 
Carolina 10 34.8 65.2 55 17.8 82.2
North Dakota 5 45.6 54.4 60 12 88
Ohio 5 33.6 66.4 55 18.8 81.2
Oklahoma 5 50.0 50.0 60 26.4 73.6
Oregon 5 56.5 43.5 60 12.0 88.0
Pennsylvania 10 24.8 75.2 60 14.0 86.0
Rhode Island 10 58.3 41.7 55 49.6 50.4
South 
Carolina 8 33.3 66.7 58 17.7 82.3
South Dakota 3 52.6 47.4 65 4.6 95.4
Tennessee 5 56.0 44.0 55 19.8 80.2
Texas 5 45.1 54.9 62 8.2 91.8
Utah 4 52.2 47.8 55 25.6 74.4
Vermont 5 35.2 64.8 55 3.6 96.4
Virginia 5 49.5 50.5 65 15.8 84.2
Washington 10 55.9 44.1 65 40.9 59.1
West Virginia 5 56.0 44.0 55 36.5 63.5
Wisconsin 5 63.7 36.3 57 43.8 56.2
Wyoming 4 41.5 58.5 55 7.2 92.8
Median State 5 44.5 55.5 58 19.7 80.3
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PenalTIes foR mobIlITy
School districts or the state pension plans might not be that concerned with the plight of teachers 
who taught for only a few years and then left. Employers are able to pass on their savings from 
young and mobile teachers and provide a larger benefit to those who do choose to stay. So 
perhaps it’s no surprise that the teachers who remain in the system long enough to maximize 
their benefits—an ever-shrinking group—are the most organized politically, via teachers unions 
and other stakeholder groups.
The losers are future teachers and mobile teachers who are diffuse, 
unorganized, and in many cases not even aware of how the system 
will or already has disadvantaged them. How big are their losses? 
The details vary by state and depend on whether the state provides 
non-vested teachers with only their own contributions; their 
own contributions plus interest; or their own contributions, the 
employer contributions, and interest. The chart on the next page 
shows how these policies affect an individual teacher. It assumes she 
earns a base salary of $40,000 a year, and it uses the median state plan’s assumption for employee and 
employer contribution rates and for the interest rate on investments.9
In every state, if and when a teacher leaves the pension plan, she gets at least her own 
contributions back. In six states, including Illinois, plus the District of Columbia, that’s all 
she would get, even though her employer has been contributing on her behalf and the pension 
plan has (presumably) been able to grow the money through investments. At the opposite end, 
teachers in only two states—Colorado and South Dakota—receive their own contributions, 
their employer’s contributions, and some amount of interest. Forty-one states allow a teacher to 
Many state systems have put 
in place penalties for mobility 
that can amount to hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in lost 
pension wealth. 
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withdraw her own contributions and grant her some interest but do not pay out her employer’s 
contributions. The difference between the best and worst of these policies can equal up to 6.5 
percent of a teacher’s annual salary for one year, or, because of compound interest, 22.6 percent 
of a teacher’s annual salary after three years. To put this in dollar terms, a hypothetical teacher 
earning $40,000 a year could face a savings penalty of $2,601 for one year and $9,035 if they 
leave after three years. This money stays with the pension funds and can be used to supplement 
the pensions of the remaining teachers. 
The media often tells stories about teachers purchasing school supplies out of their own pockets. 
Nationally, those out-of-pocket expenditures average $356.10 While those stories garner 
significant attention each fall around the start of the school year, thousands of teachers lose out 
on much more than that amount, every year, in retirement savings. These losses diminish the 
foundation for retirement savings for today’s early- and mid-career teachers. 
It may be hard to be sympathetic to teachers who teach for only a few years before becoming 
ex-teachers. But the problems do not just adversely affect people who choose to leave teaching 
altogether. Substantial penalties for mobility within the teaching profession affect the tens of 
thousands of teachers who move between states or districts for personal or professional reasons 
ever year. Many state systems have put in place penalties for mobility that can amount to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in lost pension wealth. A teacher who splits a thirty-year career 
between two pension plans would accumulate between 41 and 74 percent less in pension wealth, 
depending on the state, than a peer with the same longevity in only one pension plan.11 Teachers 
can lose more than half of their pension wealth just for moving once; if a teacher moved multiple 
times—if, for example, her spouse were in the military—the losses would be even greater.
fIgURe 3
Return 
Policy at 
Withdrawal
Number 
of 
States
Annual 
Member 
Contribution
Annual 
Employer 
Contribution
Interest 
Rate
Value After 
One Year
Value After 
Three Year
Teacher 
Contributions 
Only 
7 $2,400 $2,230 8% $2,400 $7,200
Teacher 
Contributions  
Plus 
Compound  
Interest
41 $2,400 $2,230 8% $2,592 $8,415
Teacher and 
Employer 
Contributions  
Plus 
Compound  
Interest
2 $2,400 $2,230 8% $5,001 $16,235
“Policy Issue: Pensions,” available online at http://www.nctq.org/statePolicy/policyIssueFindings.do?policyIssueId=4&stateId= 
(accessed March 2014)
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The TeaChIng PRofessIon has Changed
While the basic structure of teacher pension systems remain largely the same as when they were 
first adopted, the teaching profession itself has changed a good deal over the past quarter century. 
In 1988, if you asked teachers how many years of experience they had, the most common answer 
would have been fourteen or fifteen years. State retirement systems that favored longevity suited a 
large portion of the workforce.
In the intervening years, the landscape has changed significantly. In 2008, if you asked teachers 
the same question about how many years of experience they had, the most common answer 
would have been one year, followed by two years.12 Today, people come in and out of the 
profession. They might start out as science teachers but decide to go into business, or they might 
be scientists and switch careers and become teachers for a while. This trend is not just evident in 
teaching: The Bureau of Labor Statistics followed all Baby Boomers throughout their working 
careers and found that the average Boomer held 11.3 jobs between the ages of eighteen and forty-
six.13 Although turnover decreases with age, the median adult employee in the U.S. has about five 
years of experience with his current employer.14 
The teaching profession is likely to keep changing in the future. In recent years, state leaders 
have placed a renewed focus on linking effectiveness with human capital strategies around 
teacher recruitment, training, evaluation, and compensation. A 2012 analysis by Bellwether 
Education Partners found that nearly half the states had enacted new ways to evaluate teachers 
and link the results to key personnel decisions, such as tenure, reductions in force, dismissal of 
underperforming teachers, and retention.15 States are also moving in the direction of setting a 
higher, and later, bar for earning tenure. If those efforts succeed, more teachers will be forced 
out of the profession. We may even start to see a different workforce, one that values efficacy, 
flexibility, and opportunity more than stability and predictability. 
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Regardless of how one feels about these developments, pension 
systems need to grapple with the fact that they are providing 
benefits to a different workforce than they had in the past. As 
education leaders and policymakers struggle to identify highly 
effective teachers, increase their numbers, and distribute them 
equitably, many pension structures are misaligned with the 
changing workforce. For example, defined benefit formulas 
rely on age and years of experience, and are blind to teacher 
effectiveness. They provide few incentives for early-career teachers and strong push and pull 
effects that help retain some mid-career teachers who would otherwise leave and that push out 
late-career teachers who would otherwise remain.16 To maximize their pension benefit—an 
understandable preference—some late-career teachers remain teaching even when they might 
otherwise prefer to retire. When Illinois offered an early retirement package to teachers in the 
mid-1990s, large numbers of older, more experienced teachers retired. With an influx of new 
teachers taking their place and a rapid decline in average teacher experience, we would have 
expected student achievement to go down. Instead, student math and English test scores either 
stayed the same or went up.17 There may be multiple reasons for this, but it’s clear that the 
buyouts didn’t hurt student learning.
Economists and outside observers are not the only ones claiming there are perverse incentives 
hidden in current the current pension system. Teachers themselves report that pension incentives 
can have adverse effects on their colleagues. In a nationally representative sample of teachers, 
nearly three out of four agreed that “too many veteran teachers who are burned out stay because 
they do not want to walk away from the benefits and service time they have accrued.”18 About 
the same number indicated that making it easier to leave and return to teaching without losing 
retirement benefits would help attract and retain high-quality teachers.19
Evidence from the states suggests that some teachers are looking for choice in retirement plans. 
When new Florida teachers were given the option between enrolling in the state’s traditional 
defined benefit (DB) plan or a 401(k)-style defined contribution (DC) plan, one-quarter to one-
third of all new teachers chose the DC plan, even though the DB plan was the default option.20 
In Washington State, when teachers were given the option between the state’s traditional DB plan 
or a hybrid plan with both DB and DC elements, 52 to 75 percent of all new teachers chose the 
hybrid option.21 These figures suggest that at the very least, a portion of the teaching workforce 
would like a different option than traditional DB plans. 
Pension systems need to 
grapple with the fact that 
they are providing benefits 
to a different workforce  
than they had in the past
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The naTIonal ReTIRemenT CRIsIs 
Over the past thirty years, private sector workers have been asked to take increasing 
responsibility in saving for retirement. They decide whether to participate in their employer’s 
retirement benefits, they decide how much to save, and they decide where to invest. Public 
policies set tax exempt savings limits and basic rules for individuals, but ultimately, individuals 
must make their own decisions. 
So far, the experiment in self-financed retirement is not turning out well—the latest figures 
suggest that millions of Americans face a “retirement insecurity” crisis whereby they’ll have 
to work more years or survive on significantly lower incomes, a result of poor savings habits, 
stagnant wages, and an uneven economy. According to a June 2013 analysis by the National 
Institute on Retirement Security, 45 percent of working-age households have no retirement 
account assets at all. Using Federal Reserve data, the study found that 92 percent of all 
working households do not meet conservative retirement savings targets for their age and 
income. Worse, two-thirds of those nearing retirement have accumulated total retirement 
savings less than their annual income.22 
The failure of retirement saving in the private sector is a result of poor individual decisions 
and an absence of strong public policies supporting positive saving habits. Advocates have 
called for strengthening those policies by requiring employers to automatically enroll workers 
in 401(k) plans, subtly “nudging” employees to save more, and preventing workers from 
cashing out their savings before retirement. Such steps would address many of the historical 
problems of 401(k) plans. If policymakers create more portable, individualized retirement 
savings plans for public sector workers, they should learn from these mistakes as well. 
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But public sector defined benefit plans have their own retirement security issues. Instead of an 
absence of strong policies, state and local government workers, including teachers, suffer from 
public policies that directly impair retirement security for young and mobile workers. 
At 3.3 million, public schools teachers are one of the largest professions in the U.S., and their 
retirement security should be a national concern. There are more public school teachers than 
there are retail salespersons, cashiers, or secretaries and administrative assistants.23 Teachers 
are often compared to members of professions with similar educational levels like nurses 
or social workers, but public school teachers are as large a group as those two professions 
combined, and teachers are the single largest class of workers with bachelor’s degrees or higher 
(see Figure 4 below).24
And yet, our public policies systematically hamper the retirement security of this enormously 
important group of workers. It’s dreadful public policy to disadvantage the largest class of B.A. 
workers in the country in the early years of their careers. If we want workers to plan ahead and 
save for retirement, we should not have public policies that run counter to that goal.
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The TRIllIon dollaR goRIlla
States have made pension plans less friendly for teachers because of financial problems. 
Collectively, the gap between what states have saved for teacher pensions and what they have 
promised totals $390 billion.25 Teacher pensions are an important part of the more than $1 
trillion shortfall states face for public sector pensions and benefits today.26 When the ratio 
between what states have and what they have promised falls below 100 percent, the plan is 
said to be “underfunded.” Funding levels vary widely, but as of 2012, the teacher pension 
plan in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia were underfunded. In most states with 
significant financial problems, the current underfunding problems took years to manifest. 
Poor investment returns, unrealistic investment assumptions, badly timed or ill-considered 
benefit enhancements, the failure of elected officials to make the financial contributions they 
committed to, and other causes contributed to the current funding status.
One way employers have and will continue to respond to rising pension costs is to cut 
back on other things. Instead of hiring more teachers or paying them more money, 
districts have been and will continue to devote an increasing share of finite resources to 
pensions. For example, from 2004 to 2013 school districts increased their spending on 
retirement costs from 11.9 to 17 percent of teacher salaries.27 These benefit decisions are 
often made at the state level and are mandatory for districts and participating charter 
schools regardless of their spending priorities. 
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School districts are already making tough trade-offs to address years of inadequate funding. 
Chicago, for example, recently laid off nearly 1,000 teachers, roughly 4 percent of its teaching 
workforce, to counteract rising pension costs and had its bond ratings lowered as a result of 
the state’s.28 A recent analysis found that pension costs in Philadelphia are projected to rise 
fivefold over the next decade, an increase that could cost 1,203 to 3,077 teacher jobs, or up 
to one-third of the city’s teaching force.29 In St. Louis, pension costs have doubled in the past 
seven years and now eat up 10 percent of the district’s budget.30 
For poorly funded plans, increasing employer and employee contribution rates, lengthening 
vesting periods, limiting the ways employees can “spike” their benefits by counting sick 
leave or vacation days toward pensions, and other reforms could put pension plans on a 
sounder fiscal footing. These changes would obviously be for the good. But they would be 
incomplete reforms, because what policymakers would have accomplished is a shoring up of a 
fundamentally outdated system.
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ReTIRemenT benefITs foR TomoRRow’s woRkfoRCe 
Pension reform cannot be expected to entirely solve the human capital problems facing 
American elementary and secondary education. But given the link between compensation and 
human capital challenges, as well as the clear disincentives for entering the profession that 
exist today, it is essential that conversations on pension reform and improving teacher quality 
do not happen in isolation. Any changes will create winners and losers, but the current system 
creates winners and losers already. The following are guiding principles that policymakers 
should consider in making changes to their state’s pension plan: 
JoIn soCIal seCURITy 
While Social Security faces its own set of unique problems, enrolling all employees in Social 
Security is another way states and districts could provide benefits to a mobile workforce. 
Because it’s a national retirement security program, Social Security is the very definition of 
portable. From the employer’s perspective, Social Security also eases the burden on state 
or district pension plans. Participating employers are able to offer their own less expensive 
pension plans, which helps lower their unfunded liability and reduce funding uncertainty. 
Clean UP The fInanCIal mess and addRess hUman CaPITal PRoblems
By focusing only on the financial aspects of plans, policymakers neglect the main purpose of 
retirement plans in the first place: to offer an attractive and secure retirement to employees. 
While the national debate about pension reform focuses on funding and sustainability issues, 
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it’s possible to have a fiscally sound pension plan that nonetheless doesn’t meet the needs of 
the vast majority of workers or works at cross-purposes with efforts to improve the quality 
of the teaching force. States are shoring up the financial aspects of plans while making the 
benefits worse. State leaders must resist the temptation to fix only the most pressing financial 
problems, which risks making their state less attractive to current or future teachers. 
States shouldn’t expect to dig out of this problem overnight. Nor should they ask new teachers 
to bear the full burden of past mistakes. Instead, states should think long-term about how 
to get new employees enrolled in more fiscally sustainable and portable retirement plans. At 
a minimum, states should ensure that teachers leaving the pension plan can take with them 
their own contributions, a share of the interest those contributions accrued, and a share of the 
employer contributions that were made on their behalf. 
TaCkle The RIghT PRoblems 
The debate over public sector pensions is, unfortunately, too often framed in terms of outrage 
at the pension plans’ generosity. Newspapers find and report on retired public sector workers 
who “spiked” their pension benefits by (legally) cashing out vacation and sick days to make 
their final salaries look higher than they were. The public thinks issues like these are the 
biggest problems with current pension plans, so these are the problems legislators tackle. 
While it’s important to address the various perverse incentives that exist today, they are a 
relatively small part of the problem, and none of these fixes does anything to change the 
structure of pension plans and ensure that they meet the needs of today’s workforce. 
make TRansPaRenCy a PRIoRITy
As rising pension costs begin to cut into state and local budgets, policymakers should be 
transparent about the fiscal decisions they’ll be forced to make. While pensions have not 
historically taken up a large share of state and local budgets, many states are going to have 
to devote more resources to addressing funding shortfalls. That money must come from 
somewhere, and there’s already evidence that pension costs are limiting the ability of school 
districts to pay teachers more money and hire more teachers. At the state level, policymakers 
will need to make tough choices about funding pensions or providing ongoing services like 
parks, prisons, and higher education. 
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States must do a better job of informing teachers and the public about funding decisions. 
Many teachers are unaware of how much their district is contributing to state pension systems 
on their behalf. States could require that all districts show, on each educator’s pay stub, 
exactly how much their employer is contributing toward their retirement. 
aCknowledge UnCeRTaInTy 
States project future costs of pensions plans as if they know exactly how the next thirty 
years will play out. But their projections are based on a number of assumptions about how 
well their investments will perform, how much employees will earn in the future, how long 
employees will work, and how long pension beneficiaries will live after they retire. If any of 
those projections are off—if investment returns do not match historical rates, for example—
states could owe much more than they’ve projected. Instead of reporting one seemingly precise 
estimate for how much they need to save, pension plans should provide the public with a 
range of possibilities showing what might happen with better than expected, expected, or 
worse than expected results.
desIgn solUTIons wITh The weaknesses of 401(k)s In mInd
State policymakers should not merely try to force public sector workers like teachers into 
plans modeled after the private sector. The private sector experiment with 401(k) plans 
provides learning opportunities for policymakers to design better retirement benefits. That 
includes acknowledging that teachers are human, and humans make mistakes. Public policies 
should allow choice but use “nudges” to help individuals make wise decisions. For example, 
research has shown that the default option matters tremendously: automatic enrollment in 
401(k) plans boosts participation rates in employees’ first year by 45 to 58 percentage points.31 
Policymakers should also explore other mechanisms to encourage better saving habits, such 
as setting mandatory contribution rates, using automatic increases when employees get a 
raise, matching employee contributions to a certain level, limiting options to low fee life cycle 
or index funds that make investment allocations based on the individual’s age and expected 
retirement date, and converting account balances into annuities upon retirement.
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be CReaTIve 
The debate between traditional pensions and 401(k)-
style DC plans is a false one. The federal government, for 
instance, has phased out its reliance on DB plans in favor 
of hybrid retirement benefits that combine a less generous 
defined benefit plan, enrollment in Social Security, and a 
defined contribution plan. This model offers some of the best features of both plans, providing 
employees with the security of DB plans and Social Security and the portability of DC plans. 
Some states have adopted similar hybrid models. 
Another alternative retirement structure, called a cash balance (CB) plan, combines many 
of the best elements of DB and DC plans. Each year, a CB plan awards employees with a 
salary credit (some percentage of their salary) and, on the balance already accumulated, an 
investment return credit (some fixed or indexed rate of return). Employers guarantee a fixed-
rate investment return usually set at some relatively safe percentage or indexed to an external 
figure like long term Treasury bonds. Workers own their accounts and can take the entire 
balance with them when they are ready to leave or retire. More than 12 million workers in 
the private sector belong to a cash balance plan,32 and state legislatures in Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, and Nebraska have all adopted cash balance plans for their state employees. 
In other words, policymakers shouldn’t feel trapped in a DB versus DC debate. There are 
viable alternate options that can meet the multiple goals of improving sustainability, helping 
teachers save for retirement, and better aligning retirement policies with today’s education 
labor market. Most important, although policymakers face hard choices, change from 
traditional defined benefit plans need not be unworkable or unfavorable to teachers.
What policymakers should not do, however, is perpetuate a system that creates a small 
number of winners at the expense of a large number of losers. Retirement security is a serious 
challenge. Policymakers shouldn’t make it even harder on Americans who choose to teach for 
part of their career, our largest class of college-educated workers. 
The debate between traditional 
pensions and 401(k)-style DC 
plans is a false one.
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ComPaRIng PUblIC and PRIvaTe seCToR ReTIRemenT
Over the past thirty years, there’s been a growing divergence between the retirement plans offered in 
the public and private sectors. In 1985, four in every five private sector workers had access to pension 
plans, commonly referred to as defined benefit or DB plans. By 2011, private sector employers had 
largely abandoned DB plans, and only one in five private sector workers had access to one. Instead, 
employers began offering defined contribution (DC) plans. Teachers and other public-sector workers, 
on the other hand, are still overwhelmingly offered DB plans. Eighty-two percent of teachers and 78 
percent of all state and local government employees are still enrolled in a DB plan.33 
Like its name suggests, the employer in a DB plan defines the benefit or promised amount of money 
the employee will receive in retirement. The employer determines how much it will need to save today, 
and how that money should be saved, to pay benefits down the road. To calculate a DB payout for a 
retiring employee, the formula consists of a “multiplier” (a percentage of the employee’s salary, usually 
about 2 percent) multiplied by salary and years of service. So a DB plan with a multiplier of 2 percent 
would pay an employee with a salary of $50,000 and twenty-five years of service $25,000 a year in 
retirement. The employee would receive that amount every year until he dies, whether that happens 
the year after retirement or at age one hundred. Also, to ensure that the amount is not worn away 
by inflation over the course of retirement, most DB plans include an annual cost of living adjustment. 
Some plans set a fixed rate (such as 2 or 3 percent) for cost of living, but others adjust their calculations 
annually for inflation. 
Private-sector workers are more often enrolled in defined contribution plans. In DC plans, the 
employer communicates in advance what percentage of an employee’s salary it will contribute to 
her retirement account. Employees own the accounts and are responsible for deciding their own 
contributions and investments. 
In a typical DC plan, employers open 401(k) accounts for their workers and match a portion of 
employees’ contributions. Unlike DB plans, whereby the employer promises some future benefit level 
at some future point in time, employers must contribute to DC plans with real-time cash contributions. 
In 2013, employees could contribute up to $17,500 and workers over fifty could contribute an additional 
$5,500.34 Both employee and employer contributions to the accounts are pre-tax, meaning they are not 
subject to federal income tax prior to being deposited. This is intended as an incentive to encourage 
saving. Through contributions and investment returns, the account can grow substantially over time. 
With a few exceptions, workers are unable to access the money before they turn fifty-nine and a half 
without incurring tax penalties. At age seventy and a half or after retirement, whichever comes later, 
retirees must make certain minimum distributions, but money remaining in the account after their death 
can pass to their heirs. 
Unlike DB plans, DC plans are in workers’ names and are portable, meaning employees can take them 
with them when they leave a job. Along with this flexibility, however, comes additional risk. It is the 
worker, for instance, who decides how much to contribute and where to invest the money. Workers are 
directly accountable for their choices. In DB plans, in contrast, the institution responsible for operating 
the plans, typically the state or local government, carries all the risk. 
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fIgURe 5
meThodology: CalCUlaTIng TeaCheR ReTenTIon RaTes 
To calculate teacher retention rates, we downloaded the most recent version of each state’s 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports. Those reports include tables providing the 
state’s assumptions for teacher withdrawal rates. This paper focuses on turnover rates for 
twenty-five-year-old female teachers, but one could use the same method below to calculate 
turnover rates for male teachers or teachers of a different age. As an example, see Illinois’ 
assumptions for “terminations from active service” in Figure 5, taken from the Teachers’ 
Age
Nonvested 
Members 
Male
Nonvested 
Members 
Female
Vested 
Members 
Male
Vested 
Members 
Female
25 7.0 7.8 6.0 9.0
30 8.6 10.6 3.7 6.0
40 11.1 10.0 1.5 2.2
50 12.0 10.0 1.4 1.4
55 16.0 15.0 4.0 3.1
60 21.0 14.0 4.0 4.0
65 21.0 40.0 4.0 4.0
IllInoIs’ TeaCheR wIThdRawal RaTe assUmPTIons
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Retirement System of the State of Illinois’ Fiscal 2013 CAFR.35 The table shows that Illinois 
expects 7.8 percent of non-vested, twenty-five-year-old female teachers to depart during 
their first year, leaving 92.2 percent of the initial group remaining. That’s the one-year 
retention rate. Illinois expects the same 7.8 percent annual termination rate for teachers 
who are ages 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29. When they reach the age of 30, in their sixth year of 
teaching, Illinois assumes the termination rate climbs to 10.6 percent per year (the retention 
rate falls to 89.4 percent a year). 
Using the state assumptions, it’s possible to estimate how many teachers will reach the state’s 
vesting requirement and qualify for at least a minimum pension.  In Illinois, the vesting 
requirement for new teachers is ten years of experience. Mathematically, it looks like this: 
1-year retention:  
100 beginning teachers X (92.2 percent retention in Year 1) = 92.2 percent retention 
2-year retention:  
100 beginning teachers X (92.2 percent retention in Year 1) X (92.2 percent retention  
in Year 2) = 85.0 percent retention 
10-year retention:  
100 beginning teachers X (92.2 percent retention in Year 1) X (92.2 percent retention in Year 
2) X (92.2 percent retention in Year 3) X (92.2 percent retention in Year 4) X (92.2 percent 
retention in Year 5) X (89.4 percent retention in Year 6) X (89.4 percent retention in Year 
7) X (89.4 percent retention in Year 8) X (89.4 percent retention in Year 9) X (89.4 percent 
retention in Year 10) = 38.0 percent retention 
At the end of ten years, 38 percent of Illinois teachers would vest into the pension system and 
qualify for at least a minimum monthly payment upon retirement. Sixty-two percent of this 
group of Illinois teachers will leave before vesting. They will be entitled to a refund of their 
own contributions to the defined benefit plan, but they will not be eligible for any interest on 
those funds and they must forfeit the contributions their employer made on their behalf. 
Although these are state assumptions for the future, pension plans conduct occasional 
“experience surveys” to compare their assumptions to actual historical turnover rates. This 
calculation understates the rate of total turnover because it does not include teachers who 
leave the profession for early retirement, death, or disability. 
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